
Comment: the TfL data breach is being treated as a story about hackers, but it is just as much a story about hoarding. A public body that holds a quarter of a million Londoners’ security answers, home addresses and birth dates should expect to be targeted, and should be forced to justify every field it keeps.
This is a comment piece, and the argument is simple. The TfL data breach, confirmed this week, is less a failure of one firewall than the predictable result of a system built to collect more than it needs. Our news report on the Oyster photocard breach sets out the facts. Here is what I think they mean.
What does the TfL data breach tell us?
Transport for London says about 265,000 Oyster photocard customers may have had their account details compromised. According to the BBC, the exposed information includes names, email and home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and security questions and answers. TfL says passwords, bank details, photographs and journey information were not taken.
Look at who holds these accounts. They cover Zip Oyster cards, which The Register notes are issued to children as young as five, plus students, apprentices, care leavers, veterans and Londoners aged 60 and over.
TfL’s reassurance is that the worst items stayed safe. A name, an address, a date of birth and a phone number are precisely what a fraudster needs to sound convincing on the phone.
Why should an “attractive target” collect less?
Shashi Verma, TfL’s director of technology strategy and revenue, told BBC Radio London that “if you’re an attractive target, you have to be prepared that somebody will come after you, and find a weakness and get inside”. He added that the breached system was “tested quite thoroughly last year”.
I take him at his word, and that is exactly the point. If breaches are close to inevitable, the sensible response is not to keep promising better locks. It is to put less in the building. The UK GDPR already says personal data must be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary”, a principle the Information Commissioner’s Office calls data minimisation. Its guidance adds that breaching the principles can bring the highest tier of fines, up to £17.5 million or 4% of worldwide turnover.
Ask the awkward questions. Does a pensioner’s travel account need a stored security question and answer at all? Does a photocard system need to keep every detail for ever, on a website that can be reached from anywhere? TfL has not said, and a body this size should be able to say.
Is TfL’s cyber-security record good enough?
Mr Verma said TfL has “a very successful track record of keeping data secure” and has added “a lot more security” since 2024. The facts around that claim are less comfortable. The BBC reports this is the second time in just over two years that the photocard system has been taken down by a cyber incident. In September 2024 an attack forced TfL to suspend new photocard applications for more than two months. TfL first contacted about 5,000 customers over possible bank-detail exposure, but the BBC later revealed that the data of about 10 million people had been stolen.
The ICO cleared TfL of wrongdoing over how it handled that earlier incident, and The Register reports it took no enforcement action, judging the response proportionate. That may be fair on its own terms. But it tells us the regulator tested how TfL responded, not whether so much data should have been there to steal. The Register also says there is nothing at present to suggest the two incidents are related, and TfL has not said how the intruders got in. So the honest position today is that we do not yet know.
Prompt action deserves credit: TfL shut the website down and told the ICO.
What should be done differently?
Three things would make me more confident than another apology.
- A published data inventory for the photocard scheme, listing each field TfL holds, why, and for how long.
- An end to security questions as a sign-in method wherever a safer alternative exists. They are a second set of personal facts waiting to be stolen.
- An independent review, shared with the public, that looks at what was collected as well as how it was defended.
It is the law’s own principle, applied to a body that handles the personal data of children. The question is whether anyone checks.
What happens next, and what it means for you
The photocard website remains offline, so you cannot apply for or renew a card online. According to the BBC, existing cards still work for travel, and customers who need to renew or discuss journey history can call TfL customer services on 0343 222 1234. TfL says all photocard customers will be asked to change their password and their security question and answer, and that you should change any reused details elsewhere.
If you hold a photocard, treat any message about your Oyster account with suspicion and go to TfL directly rather than clicking a link. Because names, addresses and birth dates are involved, convincing scams are the realistic risk.
Will the ICO look at whether TfL held more than it needed? Will TfL explain how the attackers got in? For more on how everyday systems fail, see our technology coverage and the rest of our opinion columns.


































