
Comment: the Apple encryption order is the clearest sign yet that Britain’s surveillance powers have outgrown their secrecy. A tribunal has now forced ministers to admit what everyone already knew. The argument in this column is that the government should stop defending the order in the dark and let Parliament and the public judge it in the open.
The argument in brief
- The Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled on 19 November 2026 that the government has given Apple a technical capability notice.
- The ruling is procedural: it does not decide whether the notice is lawful, and a full hearing is expected in the first half of 2027.
- Apple has withheld its strongest iCloud encryption setting, Advanced Data Protection, from UK users since February 2025.
- Liberty estimates around 40 million people in the UK use iCloud, so any weakening of its protection reaches a large share of the country.
This is a comment piece. The Apple encryption order was the subject of our news report on the tribunal ruling, which sets out what the judges decided. Here I want to argue what should follow from it.
Why was the Apple encryption order ever secret?
The Apple encryption order stayed secret because the law bars companies from disclosing a technical capability notice, and the Home Office applied its standard “neither confirm nor deny” policy. That policy suits genuine operations. It makes much less sense once the existence of the notice is common knowledge.
The Register reported that the three judges pointed to extensive public reporting, statements by US officials and media briefings they concluded had been authorised by the UK government. In other words, the government was refusing to confirm something its own side had, in the tribunal’s view, already helped to put into the public domain. Maintaining the pretence did not protect national security. It protected the government from scrutiny.
The story first surfaced in February 2025, when the Washington Post reported that the Home Office had demanded access to iCloud. Apple then withdrew Advanced Data Protection for British users. For almost two years, citizens were left to infer what their own government had done to their phones’ backups.
What does the government say, and is it persuasive?
A government spokesperson said that terrorists, child abusers and organised crime groups “cannot be allowed to operate beyond the reach of the law”, and that the notice “simply requires that they maintain the ability” to help police and intelligence agencies. The spokesperson added that the government never has direct access to a company’s systems or data.
The aim is legitimate, and nobody serious disputes that police need lawful routes to evidence. The weakness is in the word “simply”. Where a company holds the keys, it can be served with a warrant. Where it does not, as with Advanced Data Protection, it cannot comply. A requirement to “maintain the ability” therefore amounts, in practice, to a requirement not to build the strongest protection for the people who use the product.
That is a policy choice with consequences for everybody, including the law-abiding majority. It deserves a public argument, not a sealed one.
What does the tribunal ruling actually settle?
The ruling settles one narrow question: the notice can be acknowledged in open proceedings. It does not say the notice is lawful or unlawful, and it does not reveal what the notice demands. The judges accepted that some material would damage national security if disclosed.
They were also careful about the boundary. As quoted by the Register, the judgment says that “it is not, however, practical to determine the precise boundaries now”. Liberty, which brought a separate challenge with Privacy International and two individuals, called the decision a victory for transparency. Its director, Akiko Hart, said encryption protects “family photos, personal messages, bank details and health records”.
The wider history matters. Tulsi Gabbard, then US Director of National Intelligence, said in August 2025 that the UK had agreed to drop a demand affecting Americans’ data, and the Financial Times reported in October 2025 that a narrower notice focused on British users replaced it, according to the Register. The practical result is two-tier privacy: US users can still switch on Advanced Data Protection, while British users cannot.
What should ministers do now?
Ministers should publish as much of the case as security allows, and Parliament should examine the technical capability regime properly. The tribunal has already said that some information could be disclosed without damaging national security. The government should lean towards that disclosure, not resist it clause by clause.
There is also a security argument that ministers rarely confront. Weakening protection for one group of users creates a standing target. Liberty’s statement warned that governments should strengthen digital security rather than open the door to hackers and hostile actors. We have seen how fragile public-sector data can be: our column on the TfL Oyster breach argued that what an organisation never stores cannot leak. The same logic applies to keys.
What happens next, and what it means for you
The parties are working towards a substantive hearing in the first half of 2027, which should decide whether the notice is lawful. Until then, nothing changes for iPhone owners in Britain: Advanced Data Protection remains unavailable, and standard iCloud protection continues, with Apple holding the keys for categories outside end-to-end encryption.
If you use iCloud, check which of your data is end-to-end encrypted using Apple’s own explainer, and think about whether your most sensitive documents need to sit in a cloud backup at all. Follow the case through our opinion section and the Liberty statement on the ruling.
The bigger test is political. A government confident in its case should be happy to make it in public. If it is not, that tells us something too.


































